effort to be heard. He kept it up, and the judge swiftly motioned to him to put it down. It was how a teacher would silently reprimand a student or child. Again, these actions were off the court record and included only in my field notes.

The defendant was then taken to lockup immediately. Sara even laughed at the defendant to the judge because he was so mouthy. She sat down on a bench and instead of following up with her client in lockup, she clicked away on her smartphone. I peered over Sara's shoulder and saw that she was playing solitaire. With time a valuable currency, I set the timer on my phone. Sara's game went on for nearly thirty minutes while her client was sent back to the Cook County Jail to linger for weeks as a pretrial detainee with no interaction with a lawyer and with a judge who supported, if not protected, the denial of representation.

Watching an outsider practice law within these norms illuminated the cultural practices that defined local justice in Cook County. This outsider, "Patty," was a stark contrast to Sara, who earned good favor with the judge and prosecutors but denied her clients access to representation and participation. Patty was brought in to represent one defendant in a case with multiple defendants. She was an attorney from the public defender's Multiple Defendant Division.[38] Patty was a highly regarded outsider but experienced in practicing law in Cook County. She was known in the Public Defender's Office but was not accountable to one particular court, as most public defenders were. The public defender regulars in the courtroom held her in high regard. For instance, "Mark" whispered to me as Patty walked into the court, "She is a great attorney . . . bright, conscientious. They want to promote her to supervisor but she loves what she does."

In this case, she was pursuing a motion for her client—a move that could have been read as running counter to the production ethic of the court culture. She introduced herself for the record.

> Patty: For the record, Patty Marco, Public Defender, Multiple Defenders Unit. Judge, we are making a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. We are ready to go today on this motion.
>
> Judge: State?
>
> SA: We are not ready to do the motion today. The police officers are not in court. We did give an offer on this case already.

The prosecution did not normally go through files in a rigorous way, unless the defense required them to do so by pursuing a motion or trial. Because

mopes were expected to plead guilty, there was little need for engagement in their cases. As in this case, the prosecutors did not prepare the case in reference to actual "legal work," but in the currency of the culture, they got something "done." Their "rebuttal" was providing a plea bargained offer. Interestingly, the prosecutor did not even consider the actual legal grounds of the motion. He had done his share on the case by "giving a good offer," so he told the judge about that. In a sense, the prosecutor was tattling on the public defender for making the motion despite the offer.

> Patty: Judge, there was an identification that took place at the police station but it was not by the arresting officer. We want to proceed with the motion.

Patty was significantly more aggressive than the other PDs who were assigned permanently to particular courtrooms. Because this was a case with multiple defendants, "Mark," a courtroom regular, was representing the other defendant. He merely listened to this exchange and the judge asked if he would like to make the same motion. He said "yes," passively, and jumped on Patty's defensive move. This was a rare moment of hearing an attorney actually give a factual basis for a motion.[39] Prosecutors had to be "provoked" to engage this deeply in a case file. It took a public defender from the outside to initiate a motion, which in turn allowed the regular public defender, Mark, to jump on the coattails. Rather than rebutting the motion with a legal argument, the prosecutor merely snitched on the public defender by saying to the judge that she already provided an offer. The subtext was that this offer was not enough to make her go away.

For attorneys, there was a considerable amount of socialization that institutionalized these cultural practices. One defense attorney talked about his indoctrination into this culture. As a new attorney, he spent a considerable amount of effort crafting legal arguments to support his motions in case he was questioned by a judge, only to receive violent responses from the judge rather than any good favor.

> One of my first introductions to the system was in front of Judge D'Angelo. I'm arguing back in chambers and the judge says, "What's this motion about?" and I said, It's based on People v. Jones," and Judge D' says, "Fuck People v. Jones." I was a young lawyer then [looking in disbelief]. It just struck me as a system that was not doing what it was supposed to do and that every participant in it was complicit in its failures.

Another attorney reflected on a similar incident that shows the persistent nature of this culture, a culture of practicing law that dated decades into the past.

> I can remember going into [judge's] chambers after filing a motion to quash arrest on a case and having a judge say to me, "Counselor, I need some reasons for granting this motion," and as a young, fresh-faced lawyer, I started listing all the constitutional precedent, the statutory violations and everything else. He goes, "No no, I need some reasons." . . . I keep giving him the law. Finally, he looks at the deputy and says, "Tell him, I need some reasons." And the deputy goes, "He needs some reasons" (motioning with his hand like he had money). I said, "I'm sorry . . . I don't have any of those reasons."
>
> NVC (Nicole Van Cleve): What year do you think it was?
>
> Defense Attorney: That would be 1984. And that was in the wake of Greylord . . . that was still going on.
>
> NVC: And that's the culture that you were talking about.
>
> Defense Attorney: That's exactly right.

This defense attorney went on to describe these culture practices as persistent and entrenched. As he explained, there is little internal resistance or "motivation" to change, even in the face of one of the largest federal investigation scandals in the nation's history, Operation Greylord.

> You didn't have an internal motivation to change; you had external motivations to change in the form of indictments. That's not really a cultural change . . . that's "oh my god, I got caught." . . . So, that didn't really affect that much culturally. That was like the difference between general and specific deterrence. There is certainly some specific deterrence: guys [attorneys and judges] were going to the joint. But, generally speaking, the culture persisted in a less obvious way. The culture continued to be an "us and them" culture with defendants. The defendants are outside of us.

The boundaries between the criminally charged and those attorneys responsible for managing the courts are blurred. This attorney even imports criminological theory, specifically deterrence theory, to understand his attorney colleagues. Even the federal indictment of nearly 100 judges, prosecutors, police, and court personnel did not make a dent in the cultural armor of the place and how they practiced law, skirted due process, and understood the defendants as a racialized "other." The culture could manifest in less-subtle ways outside the radar of federal oversight.

After speaking with this seasoned defense attorney for more than an hour, I asked whether these practices are just a case of bad lawyers or "bad apples spoiling the bunch."

> No, I think you're talking about the collective . . . the collective conscience of the system . . . the collective culture . . . I mean I keep coming back to that word. It really is a culture. Because, you know, if it's not accepted in one courtroom, everybody, back then when things were so crazy, would change their perspective and do what they're supposed to do . . . If they don't tolerate deputies speaking to people poorly, it's not going to happen. If they don't tolerate people making fun of defendants then, that won't happen. And, so that creates things.

As for the court watchers who were law students, many were shocked at decisions made in open court with little or no information about the legal basis for the judges' rulings. This streamlined an efficient way of disposing cases that to outsiders and new attorneys seemed to be just short of crossing the ethical boundaries of professional responsibility. However, because mopes were viewed in racialized terms, they were undeserving of due process and therefore there was little moral ambiguity about these subversions of law from within the court community.

Minimizing Mopes Out of the Process

Similar to the abuses that enforced racial segregation in the court, defendants were policed out of the legal process through open-court humiliation. Like children, defendants were to be seen and not heard, and defense attorneys were expected to "control" their clients—another paternalistic term that referred to the child-like nature that underpinned the meaning of "mope." "Controlling a client" meant that defense attorneys were not there to defend a client's rights in the system but to prevent the client from interfering or exercising those rights, or participating in proceedings even in the cursory ways required by law. Even the word "control" alluded to the defendant as a type of unruly being, an animal who needed a leash or a misbehaving child in need of discipline.

In many cases, a defendant's hearing began before the defendant was at the podium, with a sheriff barking orders at him. All the while, the court record would continue as though the defendant was able to actively listen to the status of his case. Some defendants would attempt to ask the judge about the case, only to be hustled off by sheriffs, with the judge yelling, "Motion defendant,